Judicial Disqualification for Personal Bias in New York State by Vanora, Jerome P.
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law
Judiciary
Volume 8 | Issue 2 Article 3
10-15-1988
Judicial Disqualification for Personal Bias in New
York State
Jerome P. Vanora
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj
Part of the Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the Judges Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jerome P. Vanora, Judicial Disqualification for Personal Bias in New York State, 8 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judges. (1988)
available at http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol8/iss2/3
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION FOR PERSONAL BIAS
IN NEW YORK STATE
1/
Hon. Jerome P. Vanora 
-
Introduction
It is undeniable that a fair trial implies a trial judge who
is impartial and unbiased. Clearly, as the New York Court of Appeals
has stated, a judge must "conduct himself in such a way that the
public can perceive and continue to rely upon the impartiality of
those who have been chosen to pass j gment on legal matters involving
their lives, liberty and property". - While the disqualification of
a judge in New York State based on interest in the ma er or relation-
ship to a party is governed and mandated by statute, - disqualifica-
tion for bias or prejudice is, at 4 est, discretionary and a matter for
the judge's personal conscience. -
1/ The author is the Chief Administrative Law Judge in the Office of
Rent Administration, New York State Division of Housing and Community
Renewal and as such decides motions to disqualify administrative law
judges for "personal bias or disqualification" made pursuant to 9
NYCRR 2051.3(d) (2) (i).
2/ Sardino v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct, 58 N.Y. 2d 286,
461 N.Y.S. 2d 229, 231 (1983).
3/ Judiciary Law Section 14 provides in pertinent part that "a judge
shall not sit as such in, or take any part in the decision of an
action, claim, matter, motion or proceeding to which he is a party, or
in which he has been attorney or counsel, or in which he is inter-
ested, or if he is related by consanguinity or affinity to any party
to the controversy within the sixth degree".
4/ Matter of Estates of Smith, 84 A.D. 2d 664, 444 N.Y.S. 2d 325
(3rd Dept. 1981).
It has been noted that there is a paucity of law on the
subject in New York and that it is ther ore appropriate to consider
the existing body of Federal case law. - The governing Federal
statute provides for the filing by a party in good faith of a "timely
and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is
pending has a personal bias or prej dice either against him or in
favor of any adverse party . . ." - The New York State Adminis-
trative Procedure Act ("SAPA"), which governs administrative hearings
conducted by New York State agencies, contains a similar provision
under which a hearing officer or adminstrative law judge may likewise
be disqualified for "personal bias". - Case law relating to the
disqualification of a judge for bias would be equally applicable to an
administrative law judge (ALJ), wqse "role . . . is 'functionally
comparable' to that of a judge". -
What Constitutes Bias
As already noted, under the statute, bias, to be disqualify-
ing, must be "personal". Bias has been held to be "personal" when it
stems from an "extra-judicial" source rather thaq from what the judge
has learned from his participation in the case. - If a judge's
adverse attitude toward a party is the result of his study of the
papers submitte in the case, there is no "extra-judicial" or "per-
sonal" bias. 107 On the other hand, an adverse attitude against a
party stemming from a preexisting racial or ethnic prejudice harbored
by the judge is from an "extra-judicial" source and is "personal" and,
thus, disqualifying. An affidavit setting forth with specificity a
judge's remarks evidencing ethnic bias is legally sufficient to
disqualify. The United States Supreme Court so held in a case under
the Espionage Act of 1917 where the defendants alleged in an affidavit
under the Federal Judicial Code that the Federal trial judge was
5/ Ortiz v. City of New York, NYLJ, 8/27/87, p. 11, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.
NY Co.).
6/ 28 U.S.C. Section 144.
7/ SAPA Section 303.
8/ Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
9/ United States v. Grinnell Corporation, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
10/ Id. at 583.
106
prejudiced against them based on their German national origin. 1-
The trial judge whose recusf/is sought passes on the legal suffi-
ciency of the allegations. - Of course, it is not for said judge to
pass on the truth of the allegations made against him for no man is
competent to judge his own cause.
It is clear that a judge cannot be made subject to disquali-
fication whenever any allegation of bias, however conclusory and
unsupported, is made. Thus, the sufficiency of the affidavit must
always be tested in light of the applicable legal standard. The
Federal Judicial Code itself requires the affidavit to disqualify a
Federal judge to "state the facts and the reasons for the belief that
bias or prejudice exists" and further requires that it be "accompanied
by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good
faith". -
It may be noted that in New York State the motion pursuant
to SAPA Section 303 to disqualify an administrative law judge is
determined by "the agency", which may by rule designate someone otheT/
than the judge himself (e.g., a supervisor) to pass on the motion.
What Does Not Constitute Bias
The cases are replete with examples of what does not consti-
tute disqualifying bias. The fact that a judge presided over a prior
trial of the defendant resulting in a criminal conviction does not
preclude him from presiding over a retrial of the same charge where
the judge detrmines that he harbors no bias or prejudice against
defendant. -
It is often said that adverse rulings by a trial judge are
not a basis for disqualifying him for bias. On a recusal motion, it
is neither necessary nor appropriate to examine the merits of the
11/ Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
Id. at 36.
13/ 28 U.S.C. Section 144.
14/ See, e.q., 9 NYCRR 2051.3(d) (2) (i).
15/ People v. Bartolomeo, 126 AD 2d 375 (2d Dept. 1987).
16/judge's trial rulings for they are subject to review on appeal. L
Even repeated rulings which clearly erroneous do not provide a
basis for disqualification. - A litigant should be aware that it is
by making timely objection on the record that he preserves issues for
later appellate review.
A judge's expressiog of an opinion concerning applicable law
is not a basis for recusal. -8/ His remarks about the merits of the
case at bar are likewise not a basis. Even where a judge's comments
on the merits at a settlement conference included an invitation to one
of the parties to move for summary judgment, it was held that no bias
or prejudice was thereby shown as a judge inviting such a motion is
not prejudging it but may well end up denying it after a full review
of all the papers. -9
During the course of a long and heated trial a judge may
occasionally lose patience and use intemperate language toward a party
or counsel. It has been held that an occasional display of irrita-
tion, wn if unwarranted, is insufficient to show bias or preju-
dice. - After alL- a judge is human and not some "passionless
thinking machine". -/ Even where there is hostility on the part of
the judge toward counsel, there is no basis for disqualification where
the judge be ves that his feelings toward counsel will not prejudice
the client. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has pointed out,
however, that where antipathy toward counsel crystallizes to the point
where counsel can do no right, there may w J be a frame of mind on
the judge's part preventing impartiality. - A judge can and should
recuse himself when he believes in good conscience that his present
1./ United States v. IBM, 475 F. Supp. 1372 (1979).
I7 Maret v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 324 (1971).
JJ/ Weiner v. Savarese, 109 N.Y.S. 2d 14 (1951), app. dismd. 112
N.Y.S. 2d 772 (A.D. 2d Dept. 1952).
/ Ortiz v. City of New York, supra.
20/ Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F. 2d 794 (2d Cir. 1966).
21/ In re J. P. Linahan, 138 F. 2d 650, 652-53 (2d Cir. 1943).
22/ People v. Wallace, 84 Misc. 2d 619, 378 N.Y.S. 2d 290 (1975).
23/ Rosen v. Sugarman, supra.
feelings toward counsel will prevent him f UP continuing to conduct
the trial in a fair and impartial manner.
Conclusion
Clearly, the motion to remove a judge for bias or prejudice
is an important albeit drastic remedy. And it can be subject to
misuse. It has been suggested that the "obnoxious pitice" of judge
shopping may be behind the making of such a motion. Or the
motivation may be the delays attendant upon making the motion and
compelling a new trial before a newly assigned judge. It may be that
the motion is viewed as a convenient vehicle for immediately challeng-
ing what are perceived to be clearly erroneous rulings which an
impatient aggrieved party believes should be corrected now rather than
later on appeal.
Even when such a motion is legally insufficient to compel
recusal, the affected judge should seriously examine his conscience.
If his impartiality may reasonably be called into question, he should
voluntarily recuse himself. For example, where a judge had been
associated with the same law firm as the attorney for a party, the
New York Court of Appeals stated that while recusal in such a situa-
tion was not legally required, it would have been "the better practice
for the court to have disqual sd itself and thus to maintain the
appearance of impartiality". On the other hand, as Judge John
Sirica (among others) has pointed out, there is as much a duty to deny
recusal and to sit when the motion is basele ,as there is to grant
recusal when the motion has a proper basis.
24/ 28 N.Y. Jur. 2d, Courts and Judges, Section 110.
25/ People v. Wallace, 378 N.Y.S. 2d at 297.
26/ Corradino v. Corradino, 48 N.Y. 2d &94, 895 (1979).
27/ United States v. Mitchell, 377 F. Supp. 1312, 1325.
